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This paper examines the power of statistical tests commonlyused
to examine the efficiency of speculative markets. Itshows that for
markets with "long horizons" such as the stock markets, or the market
for long term bonds, these tests have very low power. Market valuations
can differ substantially and persistently from therational expectation
of the present value of cash flows without leaving statistically discernible
traces in the pattern of ex—post returns. This observation also suggests
that speculation is unlikely to insure rational valuations, since
similar problems of identification plague both financial economists and
would—be speculators.
Lawrence H. Summers




The proposition that securities markets are efficient forms the
basis for most research in financial economics. A voluminous literature
hasdevelopedsupporting this hypothesis. Jensen (1978) calls it the
best established empirical fact in economics.1 Indeed, apparent
anomalies such as the discounts on closed end mutual funds and the
success of trading rules based on earnings announcements are treated as
indications of the failures of models specifying equilibrium returns,
rather than as evidence against the hypothesis of market efficiency.2
Recently the Efficient Markets Hypothesis and the notions connected with
it, have provided the basis for a great deal of research in macro-
economics. This research has typically assumed that asset prices are in
some sense rationally related to economic realities.
Despite the widespread allegiance to the notion of market
efficiency a number of authors have suggested that certain asset prices
are not rationally related to economic realities. Modigliani and Cohn
(1979) suggest that the stock market is very substantially undervalued
because of inflation illusion. A similar claim regarding bond prices is
put forward in Summers (1982). Brainard, Shoven and Weiss (1980) find
that the currently low level of the stock market cannot berationally
related to economic realities. Shiller (1979, 8la) concludes that both
bond and stock prices are far more volatile than can be justifiedon the
1Similarassertionsare very common in the finance literature.
While doubts along the lines of the discussion here,appear to be part of
an oral tradition, the only reference I could find is Shiller (198lb).
2For examples, see the recent Issue of the Journal of Financial
Economicsdevotedto anomalies in the Efficient Market Hypothesis.—2—
basis of real economic events. Arrow (1982)has suggested that psychological models
of "irrational decision making" of the type suggestedby Tversky and Kahneman (1981) can
help to explain behavior in speculativemarkets. These types of claims are frequently
dismissed because they are premised on inefficiencies and hence imply the
presence of exploitable excess profit opportunities.
This paper argues that the strength of existing evidence confirming
the hypothesis of mar}et efficiency has been vastly exaggerated. It
demonstrates that the types of statistical tests which have been used to
date have essentially no power against at least one interesting alternative
hypothesis to market efficiency. Thus the inability of these tests to
reject the hypothesis of market efficiency does not mean that they
provide evidence in favor of its acceptance. In particular, the data in
conjunction with current methods provide no evidence againstthe view
that financial market prices deviate widelyand frequently from rational
valuations. The same considerations which make deviations from
efficiency difficult to isolate statistically, make it unlikely that they
will be arbitraged away, or eliminated by speculative trading. Thus the
results here call into question the theoretical as well as empirical
underpinnings of the Efficient Markets Hypothesis. While none of the
analysis in this note demonstrates that securities
markets are inefficient, it does imply that belief in the Efficient
Markets Hypothesis is a shared act of faith, with little in the way of
theoretical or empirical support.
The first section distinguishes alternative concepts of market
efficiency and lays out the formulation used here. Tests of market
efficiency in its weak and strong forms are considered in the second
section. The implications of the results for our understanding of
speculative markets are discussed in the third and final section.—3—
I. Defining Market Efficiency
The notion of market efficiency has been defined in many ways.
Fania (1976) presents a thorough discussion of both theoretical issues and
empirical tests of this proposition. In the development below, I shall
consider the evolution of the price of a single security. It can easily
be taken to represent an entire portfolio. It is assumed that the
required expected rate of return on the security is equal to a constant r,
which is known with certainty. As has frequently been observed, standard tests of
market efficiency, are really joint tests of efficiency and a model
specifying expected returns. The assumption made here that the ex—ante
return is known and constant makes it possible to focus only on the test
of market efficiency.3
Assume that the security in question yields a sequence of cash
flows, D. These may be thought of as dividends if the security is a
stock, or coupons if the security is a bond. If the security has a
finite maturity T, then DT may be taken to represent its liquidation
value, and all subsequent values of D may be taken to equal zero. One




where represents the set of information available to market
participants at time t. This is not the form in which the hypothesis is
3Since the discussion here assumes that the model generating
expected returns is known with certainty, it will overestimate the
power of available statistical tests. Recent theoretical work such
as that of Lucas (1978) suggests that the particular model of
ex-ante returns considered here cannot be derived rigorously. This
is immaterial for the points at issue here. What is crucial is that
the discussion is carried on assuming full knowledge of the model
characterizing ex—ante returns.—4—
usually tested. Equation (1) is mathematically equivalentto the









wherethe information set in equations (2) and (3) is taken tobe
Note that once a transversality condition is imposd onthe difference
equation (3), it implies equation (l).
Equation (3) also implies that:
R_r+e
(4)
where e is serially uncorrelated and orthogonal to any elementof
Market efficiency is normally tested by adding regressorsdrawn from
to (4) and testing the hypothesis that their coefficientsequal zero,
and/or by testing the hypothesis that e follows a white noiseprocess.5
The former represent tests of "semi—strong" efficiencywhile the latter
are tests of "weak" efficiency. A vast literature,summarized in Fama (1976),
has with few exceptions been unable to reject the hypothesis of market effi-
ciency at least for common stocks. This has led to its widespread
acceptance as a scientific fact.
Thetransversalitycondition serves to rule at speculative bubbles.
5Abel and Mishkin (1980) and Jones and Roley (1982) show that other
standard tests of efficiency are essentially eouivalent to those
describedin this paragraph.—5—
II. Tests of Market Efficiency
The inability of a body of data to reject a scientific theory does
not mean that the tests prove, demonstrate or even support its validity.
As students of elementary statistics are constantly reminded, failure to
reject a hypothesis is not equivalent to its acceptance. This principle
applies to all scientific theories, not just those that are stated
statistically. Experiments can falsify a theory by contradicting one of
its implications. But the verification of one of its predictions cannot
be taken to prove or establish a theory.6
How then dove evaluate the strength of the evidence supporting a•
hypothesis? Clearly we do not simply count the number of implications of
a hypothesis which are validated. We give more weight to the
verification of some implications than to the verification of others.
For example, almost everyone would agree that findings that excess returns
cannot be predicted using past data on sunspots provides less support
for the hypothesis of market efficiency than do demonstrations that
excess returns are not serially correlated. This is because we find it
much easier to imagine alternative models in which returns are serially
correlated than we do alternative models in which sunspots can help
predict returns. The point here is that the usefulness of any test of a
hypothesis depends on its ability to discriminate between the hypothesis
andother plausible formulations. The validity of evidence purporting to
demonstrate or support a hypothesis cannot sensibly be evaluated in a vacuum.
BelowI examine the usefulness of standard tests of market efficiency according
to this criterion.
6A discussion of what it means to establish evidence in favor of a
scientific hypothesis may be found in Hempel (1965).—6—
Evaluation of any test of a theory requires pecificatiOfl of an
alternative hypothesis. A natural specification of an alternative





where lower—case letters indicate logarithms and u and v represent
random shocks. This hypothesis implies that market valuations differ from
the rational expectation of the present value of future cash flows by a
multiplicative factor approximately equal to (l+u). The deviations
are assumed to follow a first—order autoregressive process.
It seems reasonable to suppose that deviations tend to persist so that
0 <cx<1.The assumption that u follows an AR process is made for ease of ex-
position and does not affect any of the substantive points at issue. For simplicity,
it is assumed that u and v are uncorrelated with e at all frequencies.
Many, though not all, of the plausible senses in which markets might
be inefficient are captured by this specification. It clearly captures
Keynes's (1936) notion that markets are sometimes driven by animal
spirits unrelated to economic realities. It also is consistent with the
experimental evidence of Tversky and Kahneman (1981) that subjects overreact to new
information in making probabilistic judgements. The formulation considered here
captures Robert Shiller's (1979; 1981a,b) suggestion that financial
markets display excess volatility and overreact to new information. One—7—
deviation from standard notions of market efficiency which does not take
this form is Blanchard and Watson's (1982) suggestion of intermittent
rational speculative bubbles.7
DiveDiv
Adopting the approximation that log(l+u) u, and that
equations (3), (4) and (5) imply that excess returns Z (Rt_r) follow




Granger and Newbold (1978) show that since Z can be expressed as the sum
ofan ARNA (1,1) process and white noise, ARNA (0,0), it can be
represented as an ARNA (1,1) process. Equation (6) can be used to









where k denotes the kth—order autocorrelation, Note that the model
predicts that the Z should display negative serial correlation. When
7Olivier Blanchard has pointed out to me that if ct=l+r equation (5) will
characterize a speculative bubble. In this case however, market valuations
will come to diverge arbitrarily far from fundamental valuations.
8These approximations are necessary in order to obtain simple analytic
expressions. I do not believe that they have a material impact on the
conclusions since in most time periods dividends are not paid. Shiller
(l981b) presents an example similar to the one here in his defense of
volatility tests.
9This can be seen as follows. With the approximations assumed here,
Divt Div
Rt — +t+l —Pt
= ++l —+ u1
—u,where the last
equality is implied by equation (5). This can be written, using (3)
and (4) as: Rt =r+ et + u1 —.u.Combining this last equation with
equation (5) yields equation (6).—8—
excess returns are positive, some part is on average spurious, due to a
shock v. As prices revert to fundamental values, negative excess returns
result.
Weak Form Tests of Market Efficiency
At this point the power of "weak form tests" of market efficiency
can be evaluated. These tests involve evaluating the hypothesis that the
=0.Table 1 presents the theoretical first order autocorrelation for
various parameter combinations. In all cases, the paranters are chosen
to accord with the observed variance in stock market returns. Note that
(7b) implies that all subsequent autocorrelations are smaller in absolute
value. In order to get a feeling for the magnitudes involved, it is
useful to consider a concrete example. Suppose one is interested in testing
market efficiency using aggregate data on monthly stock market returns over a
50—year period. With 600 observations, the estimated autocorrelations have a
standard error of i//57 .042 on the null hypothesis of zero autocorrelation.
This calculation leads to an overstatement of the power of tests because it
counterfactually assumes a constant variance of excess returns and the
normality of e. Suppose that =.08so that the standard deviation of the
market's error in valuation is close to 30 percent, and that a =.98.
This implies that it takes about three years for the market to eliminate half
of any valuation error u. These assumptions along with the observation
that .004 imply, using (7a), that .001.10 Equation (7b)
implies that the theoretically e,xpected value of p1 is —.008. Thus,
in this example, the data lack the power to reject the hypothesis of market
efficiency even though market valuations frequently differ from the
rational expectation of the present value of future cash flows by more
10This estimate for is consistent with the 20 percent annual standard
deviation of market returns reported by Ibbotsen and Sinquefield (1976,1979).—9—
Table 1
Theoretical Autocorrelation of Excess Return Assuming
Market Inefficiency
a
.75 .9 .95 .99 .995
•2 2
a /0eu
1.0 -.0.42 - .008 _..003 .000 .000
.5
—.062 -.014 -.004 .000 .000
.25
—.083 —.022 -.007 .000 .000
— —r I rr , .1 — ...L'.J'4 — .U.)J — 'J.LL • UU.1.
.05
-.113
-.040 .017 .001 .000
.01 .122 -.048 -.023 —.003 —.001
Note: Calculations are based on Equation (7b).—10-
than 30 percent.11 In order to have a 50 percent chance of rejecting
the null hypothesis it would be necessary to have data for just over
5000 years. Note also that in this example three—fourths of variance
in excess returns is due to valuation errors u, rather than genuine
information e .Evenif
2=.10,so that all the variance in
market returns is spurious, and e2 =0,the theoretical value
of p1 is only —.01,so that deviations from efficiency could not be
detected. If, as is plausible, the serial correlation in valuation
errors is greater, the power of standard tests is even lower.
Note that these results have implications for testing efficiency in
other markets. Take, for example, ,the propositiot that long—term bond
yields represent the rational expectation of average short—term yields.
As is widely understood, this is equivalent to the proposition that no
predictable excess returns can be earned in the long—term bondmarketJ2
This is frequently tested in a manner which parallels the tests described
here. It is instructive to note that if interest rates average 10
percent, and long—term bonds are approximated as consois, a 30 percent
valuation error implies a deviation of 300 basis points between the yield
on long—term instruments and the rational expectation of average future
short—term rates. Thus, the results in this paper also suggest that
evidence purporting to demonstrate tha validity of the "expectations" theory
of the term structure of interest rates using long term bonds is not very powerful.
more formal procedure would calculate the distribution of the test
statistic (i—)underthe alternative hypothesis. It should be obvious
that carrying out this procedure would support the assertions in the text
12See Jones and Roley (1982).—11—
Two plausible objections might be lodged against this discussion.
It might be that data at higher frequencies would yield more powerful
tests. Further, the discussion so far has focused only on tests for
first—order autocorrelation. Suppose one had daily rather than monthly
data on excess returns over a 50—year period. It is true that one could
then estimate daily autocorrelations much more accurately. In fact, the
standard error would be approximately 1//50:250.009. However, if a
was .98 using monthly data, it would be approximately .9990 using daily
data so that the theoretical autocorrelation under the assumptions made
earlier would be —.0005. Thus, the power of the data to reject
inefficiencies of the type considered here is not enhanced by obtaining
more frequent observations. Given the nature of the inefficiency being
considered —persistentmiscalculations —thisshould not be surprising.
As has been noted, the model predicts that the first—order
autocorrelation should exceed those at higher orders. Thus, the remarks
above apply to tests of other individual autocorrelation coefficients.
Sometimes, however, a joint test of the hypothesis of zero
autocorrelations at' all orders is performed. The Box—Pierce Qstatistic
is normally used for this purpose. This statistic is computed as
Q-n k (9) k1
andis distributed as x2 with m degrees of freedom under the null
hypothesis. In the example considered here, using monthly data, the
theoretically expected value of Qis.29 for ml0, .49 for m=20, and.61—12—
for m=30 compared to critical values at the five percent level of 18.3,
31.4, and 43.8, respectively. To state the conclusion more dramatically,
in order to have a 50 percent chance of rejecting the hypothesis of market
efficiency, assuming 30 autocorrelations are used to form the a—statistic,
one would have to have approximately 1200 years worth of monthly data.
These results have implications for tests of market efficiency which
go beyond the examination of serial correlation in excess returns. It
has frequently been noted that one is unable to reject the hypothesis
that excess returns follow a white noise process after a jump, following
significant events such as stock splits and dividend announcements. The
preceding discussion makes clear that this provides essentially no evidence
against the hypothesis that the market either systematically over— or
under—reacts to these announcements. In neither case would significant
serial correlation be observed.
Tests of Semi—Strong Efficiency
In closing the last section on weak—form tests we considered one
type of test for semi—strong efficiency —examiningthe profitability of
strategies of buying or selling following certain types of announcements.
Here we consider a different type of test. Equation (5) implies that
expected excess returns should be negative when Pt >pand positive
when Pt <p.This reflects the assumed tendency of market prices to
return towards the rational expectation of the present value of future
cash flows. The key question is whether these expected excess returns
are large enough to be detectable.
In practice any effort used to test efficiency in this way runs into
the problems that p is unobservable. This problem is assumed away so
that the hypothetical tests considered here have far more power than any—13--
test that could actually be devised. Under the assumptions that have





In the example considered above with a =.98,and 0u =.28,(10) implies
that when the market was undervalued by one standard deviation, the
expected excess monthly return would be (.02)(.28) =.0056.This contrasts
with a standard deviation of monthly returns of .06.
How much data would it take for these excess returns to be
discernible statistically? Suppose that the regression equation
Z =a+ b(p — +
nt (11)
is estimated. Equation (10) implies that E(b) =(1-a).The
standard error of b can be calculated from the expression:
02
= (12)
In the example considered above one can calculate that 0b .01.
This implies that the hypothesis of market efficiency would not be rejected
at the five percent level, with probability ofone—half.13 If a =.99,
the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis is less than one—sixth.
Of course this discussion vastly overstates the power of any test that could
actually be performed. In addition to the problem of measuring p,
there are the problems of non—normality in the residuals, and the problem
of measuring expected returns. These factors combine to suggest that tests
of semi—strong efficiency do not have much more power against the type of
13There is one—half chance that b <E()=.02.In these cases the
null hypothesis of efficiency will be accepted.—14—
inefficiency considered here, than do tests on serialcorrelation
properties of excess returns.
II .Implicationsand Conclusions
The preceding analysis suggests that certain typesof inefficiency
in market valuations are not likely to be detected usingstandard
methods. This means the evidence found in many studies that thehypothesis
of efficiency cannot be rejected, should not lead us to concludethat
market prices represent rational valuations. Rather, we must
face the fact that our tests have relatively little power against
certain types of market inefficiency. In particular, the hypothesisthat
market valuations include large persistent errors is as consistentwith
the available empirical evidence as is the hypothesisof market efficiency.
These are exactly the sort of errors in valuation onewould expect to see if
market valuations involved inflation illusion or weremoved by fads as some
have suggested.
The weakness of the empirical evidence verifying the hypothesisthat
securities markets are efficient would not be bothersomeif the hypothesis
rested on firm theoretical foundations, and if there were no contraryempirical
evidence. Unfortunately, neither of these conditions issatisfied in practice.
The standard theoretical argument is that unless securities are priced
efficiently, there will be opportunities to earn excess returns.Speculators
will take advantage of these opportunities arbitraging away anyinefficiencies
in the pricing of securities. This argument does not explainhow speculators
become aware of profit opportunities. The same problems ofidentification de-
scribed here, confronting financial economists also plague tiwouldbe" speculators.
If the large persistent valuations errors considered here leave nostatistically—15—
discernible trace in the historical patterns of returns, it is hard to see how
speculators could become aware of them. Moreover, cautious speculators may be
persuaded by the same arguments used by economists to suggest that apparent
inefficiencies are not present. There is another logically separate point to
be made here as well. Even if inefficiencies of the type considered here could
be conclusively identified, the excess returns to trying to exploit them would
be small and uncertain.
These inferences are supported by a cursory examination of the activities
of actual speculators. A vast amount of speculative activity is directed at
exploiting riskless arbitrage opportunities through triangular trades and the
like. Traders engaged in this activity often are reluctant to hold naked
positions for as long as ten minutes and typically admit to being completely
oblivious to market fundamentals. Most risky speculation occurs in markets
such as commodity futures, where the nature of traded securities insures that
valuation errors cannot persist. In commodity markets for example, the
futures price must ultimately draw close to the spot price as the contract
date is approached. Very little professional speculation appears to take
place in markets like the stock market which have an indefinite horizon.
The principal exception to this assertion is the activities of risk arbitrageurs
who trade takeover candidates. Here again, the major uncertainty has a short
14
horizon.
While tests of the type consdered have little power to detect ineffi-
ciencies, other forms of evidence suggest that valuation errors are pervasive.
In markets, where the horizon is short and so very persistent valuation errors
14The argument here that the rational expectations assumption is untenable
in settings where it is difficult to estimate structural parameters without
extremely long time scries is similar to that made in a macro—economic
context by Benjamin Friedman (1979).—16—
are impossible, inefficiencies are frequently detected. For example,almost
every examination has concluded that forward prices are notefficient predictors
of futures spot prices in the foreign exchange market. (See Meese and Rogoff
(1982) for a recent example.) Other evidence comes from an examinationof the
relation between market valuations and fundamentals. A classic example is pro-
vided by the discounts on closed end funds. Corporations whose only assets
are easily valued marketable securities sell at a substantialdiscount relative
to the value of their assets. Observed patterns of takeover suggeststhat the
same is true of many other corporations whose assets are less easilyvalued.
A different kind of observation suggesting the incompleteness of current the-
ories is the enormous trading volume observed on speculative markets. This
is difficult to account for on the view that market valuations are rational
expectations of rational calculations performed by market participants.
The foregoing discussion suggests that a more catholic approachshould
be taken to explaining the behavior of speculativemarkets. It may be possible
to develop alternative models of pricing based onthe observed experimental
responses of persons to risky environments,These models may have testable
implications differing from those of standardformulations. More modestly,
it may be possible to explain how valuation errors oncemade can persist, by
formalizing the notions of speculator learningdiscussed above, Finally, the
analysis here suggests the importance of developing testswhich have some
power against the type of alternative hypotheses we considered.These
might focus on the aftermath of apparently irrational marketresponses.15
15
I am currently engaged in sh a study of the marketreaction following money
supplyarinour:cetnents.Re ferences
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